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International Transmission and 
Monetary Policy Cooperation
Günter Coenen, Giovanni Lombardo, Frank Smets, and 
Roland Straub
3.1    Introduction
The analysis of the implications of international economic interdepen-
dencies for the gains from cross-  country cooperation between monetary 
authorities has a long history. More than three decades ago, Hamada (1976) 
recognized that “[m]ost traditional approaches do not seem to pay due atten-
tion to the interdependent nature of monetary policies.” Hamada’s seminal 
paper has spurred a large literature addressing this issue using a variety of 
models, methodologies, and game-  theoretic concepts. The literature of the 
1980s (e.g., Canzoneri and Gray 1985; Canzoneri and Henderson 1992) 
has shown that the potential gains from cooperation are proportional to 
the size of the international policy spillovers and these, in turn, depend on 
the parameter values of the model. Since then, open economy models have 
changed considerably, calling for a reconsideration of the earlier wisdom. In 
particular, eﬀorts to give stronger microfoundations to the parameters of the 
model have resulted in the so-  called New Open Economy Macroeconomics 
(NOEM) literature (Lane 2001). Using a stylized representative NOEM 
model, Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2002) came to the conclusion that the gains 
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from cooperation are at best very small. However, Canzoneri, Cumby, and 
Diba (2002) pointed out that the NOEM literature, per se, does not imply 
that self- oriented policy- making should be recommended. The results, once 
more, strongly depend on the value of some crucial parameters (see also 
Benigno [2002] and Sutherland [2004] on this point). Moreover, Benigno 
and Benigno (2006) argued that the gains from cooperation are also crucially 
dependent on the sources of the shocks aﬀecting the economy, again a ﬁ  nd-
ing that was also true in the earlier literature. There is, therefore, a need to 
move away from the stylized NOEM models and consider richer models 
with a variety of shocks and frictions that have been calibrated or estimated 
to match international business cycle properties. In the end, whether the 
potential gains from cooperation are large or small is an empirical question. 
In this chapter, we attempt to move in that direction and therefore to close 
the circle with papers like Oudiz and Sachs (1984)—written two decades 
ago—that addressed similar issues using traditional large-  scale models.1 
Two main diﬀerences with this older literature are that our analysis does 
not impose certainty equivalence and that the welfare measure is based on 
the preferences of the agents.
In order to quantify the gains from cooperation, we use a version of the 
New Area- Wide Model (NAWM) developed at the European Central Bank 
(ECB). The NAWM is a two- region dynamic stochastic general equilibrium 
(DSGE) model that is calibrated to represent the euro area (EA) and U.S. 
economies. The version used in this chapter is a simpliﬁ  ed version of the 
model presented in Coenen, McAdam, and Straub (2007), which has been 
recalibrated in order to capture a number of empirical stylized facts. It con-
tains nominal and real frictions such as nominal stickiness and indexation in 
intermediate goods prices, wages and import prices, monopolistic competi-
tion in goods and labor markets, habit formation, investment adjustment 
costs, home bias in consumption, and incomplete international ﬁ  nancial 
markets. In addition, it features a number of diﬀerent sources of shocks 
including technology, labor supply, investment, preference, markup, and 
exchange rate shocks.
We then use the model to derive the welfare-  based optimal monetary 
policy under cooperation and under a particular deﬁ  nition of an open- 
loop Nash equilibrium. In this context, our chapter relates to the literature 
that addresses optimal monetary and/or ﬁ  scal policy in DSGE models with 
steady-  state distortions, such as in Benigno and Woodford (2004a, 2004b) 
and Schmitt- Grohé and Uribe (2004a, 2004b, 2007a). We carry out a similar 
welfare-  based optimal monetary policy analysis in a medium scale two- 
country open economy model, thereby complementing the analytical results 
in a very stylized version of a similar model in Clarida, Galí, and Gertler 
1. De Fiore and Lombardo (2007) perform a similar analysis in a three- country DSGE model 
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(2002) and Benigno and Benigno (2003). In the benchmark Cournot-  Nash 
game, we assume that each central bank takes the money growth path of the 
foreign central bank as given. However, we also discuss alternative choices of 
instruments and present results based on simple interest rate feedback rules.
Three conclusions of our benchmark analysis are worth highlighting. 
First, we show that the gains from cooperation are very sensitive to the 
degree of international economic integration. Given the current degree of 
openness of the U.S. and euro area economies, and in line with the recent 
literature, we ﬁ  nd that the gains from cooperation are small. They amount 
to about 0.03 percent of steady-  state consumption. This is an order of 
magnitude higher than the gains suggested by Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2002), 
but nevertheless very small. Allowing for stronger economic integration 
between the two regions can bring about sizable gains from cooperation. 
For example, when the share of import in gross domestic product (GDP) 
is increased from 10 to 15 percent to about 32 percent in both regions, the 
gains from cooperation rise to about 1 percent of steady-  state consump-
tion. Second, by decomposing the sources of the gains from cooperation 
with respect to the various shocks, we conﬁ  rm the ﬁ  ndings of Benigno and 
Benigno (2006) that the markup shocks can bring about larger gains from 
cooperation. Overall, the gains from cooperation are an order of magnitude 
larger for the markup shocks than for each of the other shocks we consider. 
This may reﬂ  ect the fact that those shocks are the most important source of 
inﬂ  ation variability in the economy and that they are the most problematic 
for the monetary authorities in terms of creating policy trade-  oﬀs. Third, 
we perform a sensitivity analysis with respect to various key parameters of 
the model and ﬁ  nd that the gains from cooperation become considerably 
larger when prices in the domestic intermediate goods sector become less 
sticky. With respect to most other parameters that we investigate, the gains 
from cooperation remain very small. For example, in line with the results 
of Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2002), we ﬁ  nd that complete international ﬁ  nancial 
markets further reduce the gains from cooperation. It is also worth men-
tioning that in the benchmark model the gains from cooperation are quite 
symmetric. However, this result appears to be quite sensitive to the precise 
calibration of the model.
Not surprisingly, the discussion of the results of alternative assumptions 
regarding the strategy space (i.e., the open-  loop Nash game and the simple 
closed- loop interest rate feedback Nash games) highlights that the size of the 
gains from cooperation depends very much on the deﬁ  nition of the nonco-
operative game. However, we argue that for the most reasonable deﬁ  nitions, 
the conclusions highlighted previously hold.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 lays out the 
main structure of the two-  region DSGE model. Section 3.3 discusses its 
calibration. Section 3.4 presents the two monetary policy games we study. 
Section 3.5 discusses the main results. Section 3.6 discusses the gains from 160    Günter Coenen, Giovanni Lombardo, Frank Smets, and Roland Straub
cooperation when central banks follow simple feedback rules. Section 3.7 
contains the conclusions.
3.2      A Two-  Region DSGE Model
As discussed in the introduction, the model we use to investigate the gains 
from international monetary policy cooperation is a simpliﬁ  ed version of the 
NAWM discussed in Coenen, McAdam, and Straub (2007). In particular, 
relative to Coenen, McAdam, and Straub (2007), three main diﬀerences are 
worth mentioning. First, it has only one type of representative household for 
each country. Second, the ﬁ  scal sector is simpliﬁ  ed by assuming the budget 
is balanced at all times. And, third, there are no import adjustment costs. 
These simpliﬁ  cations were mainly done for computational reasons.
Nevertheless, in order to investigate the interaction between market 
imperfections and the gains of cooperation, the model consists of several 
real and nominal frictions. In particular, the domestic goods and import 
sector as well as the labor market are subject to monopolistic competition 
and staggered price and wage setting, respectively. Notice that we only allow 
for a stochastic markup in the domestic goods market. Furthermore, we also 
assume incomplete international asset markets in order to investigate the 
impact of imperfect risk-  sharing on the gains of cooperation.
The model consists of two symmetric regions of normalized population 
size s and 1 – s, respectively: the euro area (EA), denoted as home country, 
and the United States.2 In each country, there are four types of economic 
agents: households, ﬁ  rms, a ﬁ  scal authority, and a monetary authority.
In the following, we outline the behavior of the diﬀerent types of agents 
and state the market- clearing conditions and resource constraints that need 
to be satisﬁ  ed in equilibrium. We focus on the exposition of the home coun-
try, with the understanding that the foreign country is similarly character-
ized. To the extent needed, foreign variables and parameters are indexed 
with an asterisk.
3.2.1    Households
The preferences of household i are described by the following intertem-























2. The model builds on recent advances in developing microfounded DSGE models suitable 
for quantitative policy analysis, as exempliﬁ  ed by the closed economy model of the euro area by 
Smets and Wouters (2003), the International Monetary Fund’s Global Economy Model (GEM) 
(Bayoumi, Laxton, and Pesenti 2001) or the Federal Reserve Board’s new open economy model 
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where Ci,t is a consumption index, Ni,t denotes labor services (diﬀerentiated 
across households) and Mi,t are nominal money balances;  is the discount 
factor,  denotes the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitu-
tion, and ζ is the inverse of the elasticity of work eﬀort with respect to 
the real wage. The parameter κ measures the degree of habit formation in 
consumption, and εt
C and εt
N are AR(1) preference and labor supply shocks, 
respectively. Thus, the utility of the household depends positively on the 
quasi- diﬀerence between current and lagged individual consumption, and 
negatively on individual labor supply. Money is introduced in the utility 
function in order to obtain a money demand equation (used for monetary 
policy as described in the following). The inverse of the interest rate elasticity 
of money is denoted by  and the weight of money balances in the utility 
function is denoted by εM. The consumption price index (CPI) is P t, deﬁ  ned 
later. Following most of the open economy related literature (e.g., Obstfeld 
and Rogoﬀ 2002) we assume that the weight of real balances in the house-
hold preferences is negligible (i.e., εM → 0).
Households face the following period-  by-  period budget constraint:
(1  	t
C)P tCi,t  P tIi,t  Rt
1Bi,t1  Mi,t1  ((1  
 BF))RF,t)1StBF
i,t1
 (1  	t
N)W i,tNi,t  RK,tKi,t  Di,t  Ti,t  Bi,t  StBF
i,t  Mi,t,
where Rt and Rt
F denote the riskless returns on domestic bonds and inter-
nationally traded bonds, respectively. Internationally traded bonds are 
denominated in foreign currency and thus, their domestic value depends on 
the nominal exchange rate St (expressed in terms of units of home currency 
per unit of foreign currency). The labor services provided to ﬁ  rms at wage 
rate W i,t is denoted by Ni,t, and RK,t indicates the rental rate for the capital 
services rented to ﬁ  rms Ki,t and Di,t are the dividends paid by household- 
owned ﬁ  rms from the domestic production and import sector. Furthermore, 
we have introduced distortionary consumption and wage income taxes into 






F) represents a ﬁ  nancial intermediation premium that 
households must pay when taking a position in the international bond mar-
ket. The premium is a function of the aggregate net foreign asset position of 
the country and not of the single household’s position. Finally, it is implicitly 
assumed that households hold state-  contingent securities. These securities 
are traded among households and provide insurance against individual wage 
income risk. This guarantees that the marginal utility of consumption out 
of wage income is identical across individual households. As a result, all 
households will choose identical allocations in equilibrium (for simplicity 
these securities are not shown).
The capital stock owned by households evolves according to the following 
capital accumulation equation,
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where  is the depreciation rate and 
 I(εt
IIi,t/Ii,t–1) is the adjustment cost func-
tion formulated in terms of changes in investment subject to a time varying 
AR(1) shock process εt
I.
Choice of Allocations
Deﬁ  ning as Λt/P t and ΛtQt, the Lagrange multipliers associated with the 
budget constraint and the capital accumulation equation, respectively, the 
ﬁ  rst- order conditions for maximizing the household member’s lifetime util-
ity function with respect to Ci,t, Ii,t, Ki,t1, Bi,t1, BF






























































  EtΛi,t1 
P t 
P t1,
where Λt is the marginal utility of consumption, Qt measures the shadow 
price of a unit of the investment good (Tobin’s Q), and εt
UIP stands for a 
white noise UIP shock.
Wage Setting
Households act as wage setters for their diﬀerentiated labor services Ni,t 
in monopolistically competitive markets. We assume that the wages for the 
diﬀerentiated labor services, W ˜
t, are determined by staggered nominal wage 
contracts à la Calvo (1983). Thus, households receive permission to opti-
mally reset their nominal wage contract in a given period t with probability 
1 – ξW. All household members that receive permission to reset their wage 
contract choose the same wage rate W ˜
t. Those households that do not receive 
permission are allowed to adjust the wage contract at least partially accord-
ing to the following scheme:
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where parameter W measures the degree of indexation to past changes in 
the price level P t,  is the steady-  state inﬂ  ation, and i is the index of an indi-
vidual household.
Households that receive permission to optimally reset their wage con-
tracts in period t are assumed to maximize lifetime utility, as represented 
by equation (1), taking into account the wage-  indexation scheme and the 
demand for their labor services (the formal derivation of which we postpone 
until we consider the ﬁ  rms’ problem).







where  is the wage-  elasticity of labor demand, W t is the aggregate nominal 
wage index, and Nt  1
0Ni,tdi.
Hence, we obtain the following ﬁ  rst- order condition for the optimal wage 




















This expression states that in those labor markets in which wage con-
tracts are reoptimized, the latter are set so as to equate the household’s 
discounted sum of expected after-  tax marginal revenues to the discounted 
sum of expected marginal disutility of labor.
3.2.2    Firms
There are three types of ﬁ  rms: a continuum of monopolistically competi-
tive domestic ﬁ  rms, each of which produces a single tradable diﬀerentiated 
intermediate good, Yf,t; a monopolistically competitive import sector receiv-
ing foreign goods “at the dock;” and a set of representative ﬁ  rms, which com-
bine purchases of domestically produced intermediate goods with purchases 
of imported intermediate goods into a distinct nontradable intermediate 
good Qf,t. All ﬁ  rms are indexed by f ∈ [0, 1].
Intermediate Goods Firms
Each intermediate good ﬁ  rm f produces its diﬀerentiated output using a 
Cobb- Douglas  technology,




utilizing as inputs homogeneous private capital services, Kf,t, that are rented 
from households in fully competitive markets, and labor services, Nt. The 
productivity processes, zt and zt∗, are assumed to follow a symmetric bivari-164    Günter Coenen, Giovanni Lombardo, Frank Smets, and Roland Straub
ate ﬁ  rst- order autoregressive process deﬁ  ning global productivity with cross- 
correlated innovations, as in Backus and Crucini (2000).
Capital and Labor Inputs  Taking the rental cost of capital RK,t and wage 
W t as given, the ﬁ  rm’s optimal demand for capital and labor services must 
solve the problem of minimizing total input cost RK,tKf,t  WtNf,t subject to 
the technology constraint (3).
Deﬁ  ning as MCf,t the Lagrange multiplier associated with the technol-
ogy constraint (3), the ﬁ  rst- order conditions of the ﬁ  rm’s cost minimization 




(1  	 f
t )MCf,t  RK,t,
(5) (1   )
Y f,t 
Nf,t
(1  	 f
t )MCf,t  W t,
where 	 f
t  is a stochastic (i.i.d.) subsidy to ﬁ  rms. We introduce this subsidy 
à la Benigno and Benigno (2006) in order to generate cost-  push shocks.3 In 
what follows we refer to this shock as a markup shock.
The Lagrange multiplier MCf,t measures the nominal marginal cost. We 
note that, since all ﬁ  rms f face the same input prices and since they all have 
access to the same production technology, nominal marginal costs MCf,t are 
identical across ﬁ  rms; that is, MCf,t  MCt.
Price Setting Each  ﬁ  rm f sells its diﬀerentiated output Hf,t in the domestic 
markets or to foreign importers (the demand of which is denoted by Xf,tk) 
under monopolistic competition and there is sluggish price adjustment due 
to staggered price contracts à la Calvo (1983). Accordingly, ﬁ  rm f receives 
permission to optimally reset its price in a given period t with probability 
1 – ξH.
Deﬁ  ning as P H,f,t the price of good f, all ﬁ  rms that receive permission to 
reset their price contracts in a given period t choose the same price. Those 
ﬁ  rms that do not receive permission are allowed to adjust their prices accord-
ing to the following schemes:




that is, the price contracts are indexed to a convex combination of past 
changes in the aggregate price index, P H,t, and the steady- state inﬂ  ation rate, 
, where H is a constant indexation weight.
3. Often cost- push shocks are modeled as stochastic elasticity of substitution between goods 
(e.g., Smets and Wouters 2003). Such an assumption generates ﬁ  rm-  speciﬁ  c pricing equations 
when solved to higher orders of approximation, making the model intractable.International Transmission and Monetary Policy Cooperation    1 6 5
Each ﬁ  rm f receiving permission to optimally reset its price in period t 






subject to the price indexation scheme and taking as given the aggregate 
domestic (Ht) and foreign (Xt) demand for home produced goods and sub-






Here, Λt,tk is the ﬁ  rm’s discount rate, deﬁ  ned as the households’ real 
discount factor, while DH,f,t  (P H,f,t – MCt)Y f,t are period-  t nominal proﬁ  ts.
Hence, we obtain the following ﬁ  rst-  order condition characterizing the 
ﬁ  rm’s optimal pricing decision for its output sold in the domestic and foreign 















This expression states that in those intermediate good markets in which 
price contracts are reoptimized, the latter are set so as to equate the ﬁ  rms’ 
discounted sum of expected revenues to the discounted sum of expected 
marginal cost.
Import Sector
In this section, we discuss brieﬂ  y the optimization problem of the local 
importers who import foreign goods for which the law of one price holds; 
that is, PD
IM,f,t  StP F,f,t, as discussed in Monacelli (2005). Note PD
IM,f,t is the 
“price at the dock” of the imported good f, where perfect pass-  through still 
holds. Imperfect exchange rate pass-  through, however, is ensured via nomi-
nal rigidities in the import sector. This feature implies a deviation from both 
extreme assumptions on import pricing; namely, local versus producer cur-
rency pricing that characterize a wide array of the papers in the New Open 
Economy Macroeconomics literature. The empirical evidence appears to be 
in favor of the chosen speciﬁ  cation, implying that the degree of pass- through 
is partial in the short- run but complete in the long- run, as demonstrated, for 
example, by Campa and Goldberg (2002).
In contrast to Monacelli (2005), however, in our setup imported, 
diﬀerentiated intermediate goods are combined at the dock to a composite 
of imported goods at the dock using a constant elasticity of substitution 
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Price adjustment in the import sector is also sluggish due to staggered 
price contracts à la Calvo (1983). As a result, the following ﬁ  rst-  order condi-















IM,t is the price of the composite of the inﬁ  nite number of imported 
intermediate goods “at the dock,” IM is the elasticity of substitution between 
diﬀerent types of imported goods, and P ˜
IM,t is the price chosen by import-
ers that receive permission to reset their price contracts in a given period t. 
Note also that the Calvo-  parameter ξIM can be interpreted as the degree of 
exchange rate pass-  through in the model.
Final Good Firms
The representative ﬁ  nal good ﬁ  rm (we neglect the indexation in what 
follows) produces the nontradable intermediate good, Qt, combines pur-
chases of a bundle of domestically produced intermediate goods, Ht, with 
purchases of a bundle of goods from the import sector, IMt, using a constant 
returns to scale CES technology,
(6)  Qt  (1/Ht
11/  (1  )1/IMt
11/)/(1),
where the parameter  denotes the intratemporal elasticity of substitution 
between the distinct bundles of domestic and imported goods, while  ∈ 
(0, 1) is a measure of home bias in the production of the intermediate good. 
The demand function for domestic intermediate and imported goods are 











where the corresponding price index (CPI) P t is deﬁ  ned as





Note that we assume implicitly that the share of foreign goods in invest-
ment, consumption, and government spending are the same, and that there 
are no diﬀerences in the corresponding price indexes of the variables.
3.2.3      Fiscal and Monetary Authorities
The ﬁ  scal authority purchases the ﬁ  nal good, Gt, and levies lump sum 
taxes T t and distortionary taxes (subsidies) on households (ﬁ  rms). The ﬁ  s-
cal authority’s period-  by-  period budget constraint then has the following 
form:International Transmission and Monetary Policy Cooperation    1 6 7
P tGt  T t  	t
CP tCt  	t
NW tNt  	 f
tDt.
In the benchmark New Area- Wide Model the monetary authority is assumed 
to follow a Taylor-  type interest rate rule (Taylor 1993) speciﬁ  ed in terms of 
consumer price inﬂ  ation and output,
Rt  RRt1  (1  R)R  Π
P t 
P t1
  Π  gYYt  εR,t,
where R  –1Π is the equilibrium nominal interest rate, Π denotes the 
monetary authority’s inﬂ  ation target, and the term εR,t represents a serially 
uncorrelated monetary policy shock.
3.2.4      Aggregation and Aggregate Resource Constraint
The model is closed by imposing market clearing conditions and formulat-
ing the aggregate resource constraint.
Aggregation
Aggregate Wage Dynamics  With households setting their wage contracts 
Wt according to the described scheme, the aggregate wage index evolves 
according to








Aggregate Price Dynamics  With intermediate good ﬁ  rms f setting their 
price contracts for the diﬀerentiated products sold domestically, P H, f,t, 
according to the described scheme, the aggregate nominal price index 
evolves according to








Similarly, the import prices P IM,t evolve according to:














 P f,tYf,t  P tCt  P tIt  P tGt  TBt,
where TBt  P H,tXt – PD
IM,tIMt is the home country’s trade balance.
Given the aggregate resource constraint, the domestic holdings of inter-
nationally traded bonds (that is, the home country’s [net] foreign assets) 
denominated in foreign currency, evolve over time according to168    Günter Coenen, Giovanni Lombardo, Frank Smets, and Roland Straub








Overall, the model contains six domestic sources of stochastic shocks in 
each country: a productivity, an investment, a preference, a labor supply, a 
markup, and a monetary policy shock. In addition, there is a white-  noise 
exchange rate shock (UIP) that results from variations in the costs of inter-
national ﬁ  nancial intermediation. As mentioned earlier, the home and for-
eign productivity shocks are assumed to be partially cross-  correlated.
3.3    Calibration
In order to be able to derive realistic empirical estimates of the gains 
from cooperation, ideally we would want to have an estimated version of 
the two-  region model discussed previously. In the absence of such an esti-
mated version, we have applied three diﬀerent criteria for parametrizing the 
model.4 First, our intention was to keep the impulse response functions of 
the model close to the extended NAWM as described in Coenen, McAdam, 
and Straub (2007). Therefore, we have left some of the parameters that are 
key in determining the dynamics of the model close to their values chosen in 
the NAWM. Second, we set the properties of the shocks and the parameter 
values of the model, such as: (a) to replicate the volatility and correlations of 
some relevant variables such as output, consumption, and investment; and 
(b) to generate realistic contributions of structural shocks to the variances 
of key endogenous variables. One benchmark in this respect is de Walque, 
Smets, and Wouters (2005).
We set the size of the home country to 0.43 corresponding to the size of 
the euro area’s GDP relative to the U.S. GDP. The home bias in the euro 
area is set to 0.85 and in the United States to 0.9, reﬂ  ecting the fact that the 
euro area is relatively more open than the United States. We have set the 
habit persistence parameter in both countries to 0.6, which is in line with 
a weighted average of estimates reported by Schorfheide and Lubik (2005) 
and de Walque, Smets, and Wouters (2005). The elasticity of labor supply 
is set to 2.5 in both countries. The inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of 
substitution  is set to 2.5 in the euro area and to 2 in the United States, 
reﬂ  ecting the observed relatively higher interest rate sensitivity in the United 
States.
The technology parameter  is set in both countries to 0.36, while the 
parameters determining the adjustment costs in investment are calibrated 
4. In developing the NAWM, a two-  track strategy is followed. A relatively large calibrated 
two-  country version is used for policy analysis (as in Coenen, McAdam, and Straub [2007]). 
A simpliﬁ  ed estimated version is used for projections (see Christoﬀel, Coenen, and Warne 
[2008]). The estimated version is still in development and treats the foreign block as exogenous 
and generated by a Vector Autoregression (VAR).International Transmission and Monetary Policy Cooperation    1 6 9
to 1.3 in the euro area and 1.1 in the United States, reﬂ  ecting the lower 
investment volatility in the euro area data. At the same time, the param-
eter shaping the premium on foreign bond holdings equals 0.001. In both 
countries, we set the elasticity of substitution between diﬀerent types of 
intermediate and imported goods to 6, while the elasticity of substitution 
between diﬀerent labor types equals 3. Furthermore, in order to match the 
negative correlation between output and the trade balance in the data, we 
have calibrated the elasticity of substitution between home and imported 
goods to 0.7. Price and wage indexation are equal in both countries and are 
set to 0.6, while the Calvo probabilities in the domestic intermediate goods 
and import sector as well as in the labor market are set to 0.7, in line with 
the estimates of Schorfheide and Lubik (2005) and de Walque, Smets, and 
Wouters (2005). Finally, the simple monetary policy rule is calibrated as 
follows. We set the degree of interest rate smoothing at 0.7, the interest rate 
response to inﬂ  ation at 1.7, and the interest rate response to output at 0.1, 
in both countries.
With regards to the tax rates, we have chosen the values reported, in 
Coenen, McAdam, and Straub (2007) that are based on Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) data. Namely, we set the 
consumption tax rate at 0.183 in the euro area and at 0.077 in the United 
States, while labor income tax equals 0.24 in the euro area and 0.22 in the 
United States. Furthermore, the share of government spending in GDP is 
assumed to equal 20 percent in both regions. The subsidy to ﬁ  rms (	f) is set 
to zero in the steady state.
The calibrated standard deviations of the shocks are shown in table 3.1, 
while table 3.2 compares some of the moments generated by the model with 
the data for the euro area and the United States. The calibrated model gets 
the relative standard deviations of real GDP and its components more or 
less right. However, the standard deviation of inﬂ  ation generated by the 
Table 3.1   Standard deviation of the shocks
Preference shock home 0.018
Preference shock foreign 0.018
Investment home 0.044
Investment foreign 0.009
Monetary policy home 0.002





Labor supply foreign 0.07
Labor supply home 0.06
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model is too low (a bit more than half of that in the data). Also the volatil-
ity of the real exchange rate is too low in spite of the addition of uncovered 
interest rate parity shocks. Importantly for our purposes, the correlation of 
real GDP, consumption, and investment across the two regions is captured 
quite well. This is partly due to our assumption that productivity shocks 
have spillover eﬀects across countries (the coeﬃcient of correlation of the 
two shocks is about 0.74). As highlighted by Justiniano and Preston (2008), 
open economy DSGE models have diﬃculties explaining the comovement 
of business cycles in the absence of a common component in the underlying 
shocks. The model captures the negative correlation between GDP and net 
trade, although it is less than in the data.
Finally, as the source of the shocks is a potentially important determinant 
of the gains from cooperation, we also make sure that the contributions 
of the various shocks to the variance of the core macrovariables is reason-
able. Tables 3.3 and 3.4 report the variance decomposition for the euro area 
and the United States, respectively. In line with estimated closed economy 
models, we observe that technology and labor supply shocks are the most 
important drivers of output in the long run.5 Investment and preference 
shocks are important sources of variation of investment and consumption, 
respectively, but have only a signiﬁ  cant short-   to medium-  run contribution 
to the variance of output. In both regions, the markup shocks in the domes-
tic intermediate goods sector are the most important drivers of inﬂ  ation, 
Table 3.2   Stylized facts of the model
Euro area U.S.
    Model   Data   Model   Data   Model   Data
Standard deviation
  GDP 0.89 0.93 1.01 1.02
  Consumption 0.59 0.80 0.76 0.90
  Investment 2.56 2.60 3.71 4.9
  Inﬂ  ation 0.53 1.05 0.57 1.20
  Real  exchange  rate 1.98 7.00
  Net  trade 0.26 0.46
Cross-  correlation over countries
  GDP 0.43 0.29
  Consumption 0.14 0.14
  Investment 0.25 0.17
Cross-  correlation within countries
  GDP—net  trade –0.28 –0.69 –0.47 –0.39
  Consumption—net  trade –0.19 –0.75 –0.17 –0.45
  Investment—net  trade   –0.23   –0.79           –0.39   –0.51
5. See, for example, Smets and Wouters (2003, 2007).International Transmission and Monetary Policy Cooperation    1 7 1
followed by technology shocks. The only shocks that have a nonnegligible 
impact on the variance decomposition of foreign output are the technol-
ogy shocks. This is a result of the assumption that domestic technology 
shocks have spillover eﬀects on foreign productivity, as in Backus, Kehoe, 
and Kydland (1994).
Table 3.3   Variance decomposition
Euro area
    Output   Consumption   Investment   Inﬂ  ation   REX
Euro area shocks
  Technology 55.4 26.3 41.1 27.4 11.6
  Labor  supply 19.5 6.79 15.7 8.03 9.43
  Investment 0.93 0.75 6.06 0.14 0.36
  Preferences 2.78 51.7 19.5 4.14 8.38
  Markup 5.68 1.39 1.86 52.8 7.55
  Monetary  policy 1.00 0.41 0.57 1.63 4.48
U.S. shocks
  Technology 14.4 10.9 11.1 4.69 6.79
  Labor  supply 0.12 0.35 0.28 0.10 10.5
  Investment 0.09 0.84 2.93 0.55 6.65
  Preferences 0.06 0.28 0.44 0.19 4.06
  Markup 0.03 0.12 0.03 0.17 9.02
  Monetary  policy 0.02 0.09 0.02 0.06 6.69
UIP   0.00   0.09   0.04   0.03   14.5
Table 3.4   Variance decomposition
United States
    Output   Consumption   Investment   Inﬂ  ation
Euro area shocks
  Technology 11.2 10.0 6.38 4.02
  Labor  supply 0.04 0.15 0.07 0.03
  Investment 0.00 0.02 0.06 0.01
  Preferences 0.04 0.33 0.17 0.11
  Markup 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.07
  Monetary  policy 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.01
U.S. shocks
  Technology 46.8 27.4 26.9 25.0
  Labor  supply 22.6 9.78 13.9 9.65
  Investment 9.81 11.5 42.7 2.62
  Preferences 2.36 38.4 7.05 2.77
  Markup 5.34 1.51 1.73 53.1
  Monetary  policy 1.71 0.80 0.83 2.57
UIP   0.00   0.05   0.01   0.03172    Günter Coenen, Giovanni Lombardo, Frank Smets, and Roland Straub
3.4    Deﬁ  nition of the Monetary Policy Game
The open economy dimension of our model gives rise to an international 
dimension of monetary policy. While we have used an empirical monetary 
policy reaction function to calibrate the two-  region model, for the analysis 
of the gains from cooperation in the next section, we consider two concepts 
of equilibrium in the game played by the two central banks.6 In the coop-
erative equilibrium, both central banks commit to implementing monetary 
policies that maximize the joint welfare of the euro area and the United 
States. The joint welfare is a population-  weighted sum of the utility of the 
representative households in both economies. If we denote the aggregate 
welfare function of each country by i
t : i  {EA, US}, the global coopera-
tive objective function would be t
coop  st
EA  (1 – s) t
US.
In contrast, in the noncooperative equilibrium, each central bank maxi-
mizes the aggregate welfare function of its own country, taking as given 
the entire path of the foreign central bank’s instrument. This corresponds 
to an open-  loop Nash equilibrium (Blake and Westaway 1995).7 The non-
cooperative equilibrium that emerges from the strategic game played by 
the central banks depends crucially on the instrument chosen by the two 
players, as discussed in Canzoneri and Henderson (1989), Henderson and 
Zhu (1990), Turnovsky and d’Orey (1989), and more recently in Lombardo 
and Sutherland (2006), among others.8 It is well known that changing the 
strategy space (i.e., selecting diﬀerent instrument variables) can give rise to 
diﬀerent Nash equilibria. The current literature on this subject displays a 
variety of approaches.9 For example, Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2002) consider 
6. Given the dimension of our model, we were forced to neglect optimal ﬁ  scal policy issues. 
Obviously, a complete normative analysis of optimal policies should take into account all avail-
able policy instruments. See Lombardo and Sutherland (2004) for a discussion of the global 
dimension of ﬁ  scal and monetary policy in a microfounded stylized two-  period two-  country 
model. Beetsma and Jensen (2005) discuss the monetary- ﬁ  scal interaction in a monetary union 
in a dynamic two-  country model.
7. The open-  loop Nash equilibrium implies that each central bank chooses the optimal 
allocation, taking as given the current and future choices of instrument by the foreign central 
bank (Blake and Westaway 1995). The alternative Nash equilibrium would be a closed-  loop 
equilibrium “for which the sequence of foreign instruments is known to be dependent on (some 
of the) other system variables” (Levine, Pearlman, and Pierce 2008, 3341). Benigno and Benigno 
(2006), Levine, Pearlman, and Pierce (2008), and Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (2002) discuss 
open-  loop equilibria. Feedback-  loop (i.e., closed-  loop) Nash equilibria have been studied in 
small models by Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2002) and Lombardo and Sutherland (2004). In these 
models, as in most of the older literature, the distinction between open- loop and closed- loop is 
irrelevant as the models are essentially static (with preset prices). See Canzoneri and Henderson 
(1992) for examples of strategic setups in older models.
8. The diﬀerent equilibrium allocation brought about by a Bertrand equilibrium as compared 
to, say, a Cournot equilibrium, exempliﬁ  es the eﬀect that the choice of alternative instruments 
might have on the outcome.
9. The older literature on this subject focused more closely on the classical monetary policy 
instruments; that is, money supply or interest rates (Canzoneri and Henderson 1989). Rogoﬀ 
(1985) discusses a special case in which taking the price of domestic goods as the strategic 
instrument is equivalent to using money supply. In general, though, this is not the case.International Transmission and Monetary Policy Cooperation    1 7 3
feedback money supply rules, while Benigno and Benigno (2006) deﬁ  ne the 
strategies in terms of the inﬂ  ation rate of the domestic GDP deﬂ  ators. In 
this chapter, we assume that the central bank is able to control the money 
supply and we deﬁ  ne the strategy space of the noncooperative equilibrium 
in terms of the growth rate of nominal money balances. The alternative 
option of choosing the nominal interest rate as the policy instrument does 
not deliver saddle- path stable equilibria in the open- loop Nash game (Blake 
and Westaway 1995), and therefore would produce a much inferior welfare 
outcome (at least locally).10
For the sake of comparison with the literature, in section 3.5.5 we also 
brieﬂ  y consider open- loop Nash equilibria in which CPI and producer price 
index (PPI) inﬂ  ation is chosen as the strategic policy variable. However, given 
that the central bank has a well-  deﬁ  ned objective function that includes 
other variables than inﬂ  ation, we think that these alternative assumptions 
regarding the strategy space are unwarranted in our model setup. We pre-
fer to use the central bank’s instrument (money supply) as our benchmark 
case. Nevertheless, it is worth emphasizing again that the size of the gains 
from cooperation depend, in general, on the particular deﬁ  nition of Nash 
equilibrium considered.
A brief description of the solution method is given in the appendix.
3.5      The Gains from Cooperation: Results
In the next section we report the welfare loss due to noncooperation (i.e., 
the diﬀerence between welfare under cooperation and welfare under nonco-
operation) in terms of the amount of consumption that the typical house-
hold would need to give up in order to incur the same loss in a deterministic 
world.11
3.5.1      Welfare Decomposition: Baseline Results
Table 3.5 presents our baseline results. The ﬁ  rst two lines report the decom-
position of the gains from monetary policy cooperation in the euro area and 
the United States (i.e., the diﬀerence in welfare between the cooperative and 
noncooperative equilibrium) into the diﬀerent contributions of the shocks. 
Furthermore, the table also shows the diﬀerence between the conditional 
mean and variance of consumption, labor, real GDP, inﬂ  ation, and the 
terms of trade in the cooperative and noncooperative equilibrium, as well 
10. The equilibrium produced under such a game is locally explosive. One should note that 
when a central bank chooses the optimal allocation taking as given the foreign interest rate, a 
locally indeterminate equilibrium would emerge. We conjecture that the central bank would 
choose a best response to the exogenously given foreign rate such that a saddle-  path equilib-
rium is reestablished. When two such strategies are combined together, they would produce 
too many unstable roots.
11. Denote W as the welfare gap produced by following two diﬀerent monetary policies in a 




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































4International Transmission and Monetary Policy Cooperation    1 7 5
as the contribution of each of the shocks to these diﬀerences. The ﬁ  rst two 
variables, consumption and labor, are of interest as they are the primitive 
arguments of the welfare function. Real GDP and inﬂ  ation are of interest 
as they are often used in describing the objective function of central banks. 
In particular, in ﬁ  rst generation models of monetary policy cooperation, 
inﬂ  ation and output volatility were often used as the sole arguments of the 
central bank’s objective function.12 Moreover, inﬂ  ation and output volatil-
ity may capture the cost from ineﬃcient goods production due to staggered 
nominal prices. Finally, the terms of trade is a crucial variable in the strategic 
interaction between the two central banks. The welfare gains of coopera-
tion (Et0[Welf EA] and Et0[Welf US]) are expressed in permanent steady-  state 
consumption units (percentages). The other variables are expressed as a per-
centage of their steady-  state value. The ﬁ  rst column of table 3.5 reports the 
values for the baseline calibration. The other columns display the values for 
each type of shock separately. Except for the conditional mean of welfare, 
the ﬁ  rst column is the sum of all the subsequent columns. For welfare the 
sum is not identically equal to the ﬁ  rst column due to the transformation in 
consumption units. For each single shock, the values that have a diﬀerent 
sign from that obtained under all shocks have been underlined.
Based on table 3.5 a number of observations are worth highlighting. First 
of all, the ﬁ  rst column of table 3.5 shows that the overall gains from coop-
eration are quite modest, thereby conﬁ  rming much of the recent literature. 
For both countries they amount to about 0.03 percent of steady-  state con-
sumption. This value is about one order of magnitude larger than the values 
suggested by Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2002) and within the range of values 
discussed by Benigno (2001).13 For the sake of concreteness, making average 
pro-  capita consumption equal to $28,000 per year, the gains from coopera-
tion would amount to a mere $8.4 per year per head.
In spite of a number of cross-  country asymmetries imposed in the cali-
bration, the gains from cooperation are quite similar in both areas. Besides 
the diﬀerences in some of the values of the parameters and standard devia-
tions, an important source of asymmetry is the fact that only dollar denomi-
nated bonds issued by the United States are assumed to be traded interna-
tionally. This assumption implies that the euro area and the United States 
are not treated symmetrically in terms of currency-risk hedging options 
12. For example, Rogoﬀ (1985), Canzoneri and Gray (1985), and Sachs (1983) on the second 
point and Woodford (2003) on the ﬁ  rst point.
13. Oudiz and Sachs (1984), using large- scale multicountry econometric models, came to the 
conclusion that a coordinated expansion in the face of a global shock, like an oil-  price shock 
of the magnitude seen in the 1970s, would increase U.S. GNP by about 0.5 percent “. . . [for] 
the next few years.” Their results, as those of all the ﬁ  rst generation literature on this topic, 
are based on rather diﬀerent mechanisms than those highlighted by the current generation 
literature. In the new literature, certainty equivalence is not imposed so that “. . . the monetary 
policy rule does aﬀect the expected trajectory of the economy via agents’ responses to risk” 
(Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ 2002).176    Günter Coenen, Giovanni Lombardo, Frank Smets, and Roland Straub
(e.g., Devereux and Sutherland 2007) abstracting from the foreign asset 
return premium, for the U.S. internationally traded bonds provide the same 
return as domestically traded bonds. It should be noted that the asymmetry 
discussed here captures only one aspect of the issues related with the cur-
rency denomination of foreign assets. Another aspect would emerge had 
we assumed a nonzero initial (steady-  state) net foreign asset position. In 
this case there would be a ﬁ  rst-  order eﬀect of inﬂ  ation on real income, as 
discussed by Benigno (2001). As we will show in the following, the results of 
broadly symmetric gains across the euro area and the United States do not 
appear to be very robust as we change some of the parameters.
Turning to some of the key variables in the welfare calculations such as 
consumption and labor, it is clear from the ﬁ  rst column in table 3.5 that the 
gains in welfare come mostly from an increase in the average level of con-
sumption by between 0.04 and 0.05 percent. This gain is partly oﬀset by the 
fact that both euro area and U.S. households work more in the cooperative 
equilibrium. As a result, average GDP increases by 0.1 percent in the euro 
area and 0.07 percent in the United States. Overall, the volatility of the main 
variables is lower under cooperation, but generally not by much. Turning 
to inﬂ  ation, inﬂ  ation is on average lower in the cooperative equilibrium (by 
0.07 and 0.05 percent, respectively, in the euro area and the United States). 
In other words, lack of cooperation leads to a small inﬂ  ationary bias. On 
the other hand, cooperation leads to a small improvement of the terms of 
trade of the euro area by 0.05 percent.
A second important observation from table 3.5 is that the most important 
source of gains from cooperation are the markup shocks. In our model, all 
shocks produce policy trade-  oﬀs due to the large number of ineﬃciencies 
(incomplete markets, monopolistic competition, distortionary taxes, sticky 
wages, sticky prices, and imperfect exchange rate pass- through). As a result, 
cooperation is always better than noncooperation in response to all of the 
shocks. However, as argued by Benigno and Benigno (2006), some shocks 
produce larger incentives for the central banks to move the relative price to 
their own advantage. This is particularly true for markup shocks. This is 
conﬁ  rmed by the analysis in table 3.5. The markup shocks explain more than 
three- fourths of the gains from cooperation. From the variance decomposi-
tion in tables 3.3 and 3.4, we know that markup shocks are also the single 
largest source of inﬂ  ation volatility, while they account only for a modest 
share of the volatility of the real variables. In contrast, although productiv-
ity shocks play the major role in explaining the volatility in real activity of 
the euro area and U.S. economies, they do not generate wide discrepancies 
between the cooperative and the noncooperative allocations in terms of 
welfare. Similarly, the contribution of all the other shocks to the gains from 
cooperation is an order of magnitude smaller than those of the markup 
shocks.
As argued by Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba (2002), the gains from coop-International Transmission and Monetary Policy Cooperation    1 7 7
eration are increasing in the size of the policy trade-  oﬀs generated by the 
shocks. Shocks that can be easily oﬀset by a self- oriented central bank do not 
produce international conﬂ  icts of interests. In that case, cooperation would 
not be welfare improving, as also argued by Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2002). 
In contrast, shocks that produce large trade-  oﬀs generate strong incentives 
for the self-  oriented central banks to export some of the costs to the other 
country. When both central banks pursue “beggar-  thy-  neighbor” policies, 
the net result will be a deterioration of global welfare. Cooperation, in this 
case, will be welfare improving.
Figures 3.1 and 3.2 compare the response of the euro area and U.S. econ-
omy to a markup shock and a productivity shock, respectively, under the 
cooperative and noncooperative equilibrium and the calibrated monetary 
policy reaction function. Under the cooperative equilibrium, a positive euro 
area markup shock has the usual negative impact on output and consump-
tion in the euro area. Moreover, in order to stabilize inﬂ  ation, the nominal 
interest rate increases and the terms of trade appreciate (although only mar-
ginally). More interestingly, the euro area markup shock generates positive 
comovement between euro area and U.S. GDP. In both countries inﬂ  ation 
rises and the real wage falls.
Fig. 3.1    Euro area markup shock: Coop. (solid), Nash (arrowed-  dashed), Rule 
(dashed)178    Günter Coenen, Giovanni Lombardo, Frank Smets, and Roland Straub
The latter is in contrast with the impulse responses under the optimal 
cooperative policy derived by Benigno and Benigno (2006). In their much 
simpler open economy model, which only incorporates monopolistic com-
petition and sticky prices, a domestic markup shock generates negative 
comovement between economic activity in both countries. As discussed by 
Benigno and Benigno (2006), in their simple model the crucial determinant 
of the sign of the international spillovers is the relative size of the intra-
temporal and intertemporal elasticity of substitution. If the intratemporal 
elasticity dominates, home and foreign goods are substitutes in the utility 
function (Corsetti and Pesenti 2001). In this case a foreign deterioration 
of the terms of trade will bring about a foreign expansion of production. 
In contrast, if the intertemporal elasticity of substitution dominates, the 
two goods are complements and both home and foreign production will 
contract.
These two parameters, though, are insuﬃcient to describe the relative 
response of home and foreign output if capital accumulation is introduced 
in the model. In our model, as it would happen in the model developed by 
Fig. 3.2    Euro area productivity shock: Coop. (solid), Nash (arrowed-  dashed), Rule 
(dashed)International Transmission and Monetary Policy Cooperation    1 7 9
Benigno and Benigno (2006) if extended with capital accumulation, the spill-
overs are positive under the optimal cooperative policy, at least on impact.
Qualitatively, the responses under the optimal cooperative policy are very 
similar to those under the calibrated monetary policy reaction functions. 
The discrepancy with the noncooperative policies is, however, quite large. 
The short- term interest rates and the terms of trade respond in a much more 
volatile fashion and this is reﬂ  ected in a more volatile response of consump-
tion and GDP. It is also clear that the initial response of GDP is negative in 
the euro area, but positive in the United States, as the euro area monetary 
authorities attempt to export some of the volatility in the labor costs to the 
foreign country.
A quite diﬀerent picture is obtained in ﬁ  gure 3.2 regarding the eﬀects of a 
productivity shock. In this case, the impulse responses under the cooperative 
and noncooperative equilibrium are quite similar, conﬁ  rming the limited 
contribution of those shocks to the gains from cooperation. These impulse 
responses are also quite similar to those under the calibrated policy rule. As 
is to be expected, following a temporary positive productivity shock in both 
countries, consumption, output, and wages rise persistently, while nominal 
interest rates and inﬂ  ation fall. The domestic terms of trade deteriorate as 
the productivity shock increases relative supply of the domestic goods.
As mentioned earlier, the single most important shock in accounting for 
the gains from cooperation (i.e., summing up the EA and U.S. welfare gains) 
is the markup shock. We should expect that the randomness in the home 
markup will partially spillover to the volatility of the home ﬁ  rms’ optimal 
price. The home domestic price index is a concave function of individual 
prices. This implies that the expected home domestic price index is lower 
than its nonstochastic value. This is true also when we measure the expected 
home domestic price index relative to the CPI. The lower expected price 
implies a higher expected demand and, ceteris paribus, lower expected aver-
age proﬁ  ts, as ﬁ  rms expect, on average, to be oﬀ their supply curve. The 
expected foreign domestic price index, relative to the CPI, will be higher, as 
the CPI is partially aﬀected by the drop in the home domestic price index. 
Therefore, demand is expected to switch partially from the foreign goods to 
the home goods. Whether this eﬀect is welfare increasing or not will likely 
depend on the net increase in consumption and labor eﬀort.14 Each central 
bank, taken in isolation, will try to increase consumption while reducing 
labor eﬀort.15 The policymakers would attempt to do this by aﬀecting the 
14. That welfare could be higher in the stochastic equilibrium as compared to the nonsto-
chastic equilibrium is a well-  known fact in economics. Cho and Cooley (2003) oﬀer a recent 
discussion of this result.
15. Using a simple two-  country model à la Benigno and Benigno (2006), we can see that the 
optimizing (cooperative) central bank will try to increase consumption and labor more under 
an ineﬃcient steady state than under an eﬃcient steady state.180    Günter Coenen, Giovanni Lombardo, Frank Smets, and Roland Straub
(expected) terms of trade. When both banks act in this way, the net result 
will be a deterioration of welfare compared to the cooperative equilibrium.
3.5.2      Sensitivity Analysis with Respect to Nominal Rigidities
While table 3.5 shows the results for the calibrated (benchmark) model, 
tables 3.6 and 3.7 report the results from a sensitivity analysis. We report in 
each case the overall gain in welfare and its various components, as well as 
the contribution of the euro area and U.S. markup shock and the sum of 
the other shocks in each region. Also in these cases, the mark- up shocks are 
by far the most important contributors to the welfare gains. In interpret-
ing many of these exercises, it is important to realize that the size of the 
welfare losses in general ceases to have a solid empirical basis. For example, 
imposing ﬂ  exible prices, while maintaining all other parameters unchanged, 
gives the markup shocks a disproportionate eﬀect on output.16 These results, 
therefore, should only be taken as indicative of the sensitivity of the wel-
Table 3.6   Welfare decomposition: Nominal rigidities and indexation
Variable  
All 





Lower price rigidity in intermediate- 
    goods sector (Calvo pr.  0.35)
  Et0[Welf EA] 10.9639 6.1409 5.397 0.1241 0.1271
  Et0[Welf US] 18.0099 8.2732 11.0678 0.2592 0.2412
Higher exchange rate pass-  through 
  (Calvo  pr.   0.35)
  Et0[Welf EA] 0.0353 –0.011 0.0456 0.0003 0.0004
  Et0[Welf US] –0.0001 0.0251 –0.0266 0.0011 0.0003
Lower wage rigidity 
  (Calvo  pr.   0.35)
  Et0[Welf EA] 0.0181 0.0078 0.0022 0.004 0.0041
  Et0[Welf US] 0.0207 0.0046 0.0093 0.004 0.0028
No indexation of prices in 
  intermediate  goods  sector
  Et0[Welf EA] 0.0376 0.051 –0.0236 0.0058 0.0045
  Et0[Welf US] 0.0549 –0.0217 0.0629 0.008 0.0058
No indexation of import prices
  Et0[Welf EA] 0.0438 –0.0115 0.0486 0.0034 0.0033
  Et0[Welf US] 0.0433 0.0487 –0.0136 0.0053 0.003
No indexation of wages
  Et0[Welf EA] 0.0271 0.0152 0.0052 0.004 0.0028
  Et0[Welf US]   0.0294   0.0058   0.0149   0.0053   0.0034
16. For example, the terms of trade would have a standard deviation about seven times larger 
than in the data. Euro area and U.S. GDP volatility would be twice as large as in the data, while 
they would be negatively cross-  correlated. A number of other moments would be strongly 
altered. Finally, markup shocks would explain between 54 percent (EA) and 45 percent (U.S.) 
of the volatility of GDP (at twelve quarters).International Transmission and Monetary Policy Cooperation    1 8 1
fare losses to some of the parameters of the model. Deriving empirically 
sound conﬁ  dence bands for the welfare losses would require a more complex 
approach that is beyond the scope of the present work and that we leave for 
future research.17
We ﬁ rst investigate the role of indexation in the intermediate goods sec-
tor (table 3.6). The table shows that without indexation, the gains from 
cooperation rise only marginally from about 0.05 to 0.09 percent of steady- 
state consumption. However, the cross-  country “spillover eﬀects” change 
sign: that is, while EA welfare gains increase in their own markup shock 
and decrease in the U.S. markup shock, the reverse happens in the foreign 
country. In other words, according to these results the euro area would be 
Table 3.7   Welfare decomposition: Further sensitivity analysis
Variable  
All 





Unitary intratemporal elasticity of
    substitution
  Et0[Welf EA] 0.0086 0.0061 –0.0009 0.0017 0.0018
  Et0[Welf US] 0.0065 –0.001 0.0052 0.0015 0.0007
Higher intratemporal elasticity of 
  substitution  (1.7)
  Et0[Welf EA] 0.0031 0.0013 0.0005 0.0005 0.0008
  Et0[Welf US] 0.0037 0.0007 0.0016 0.0009 0.0005
Equal intra-   and intertemporal 
  elasticities  (0.7)
  Et0[Welf EA] 0.0016 –0.0007 –0.0029 0.0031 0.0021
  Et0[Welf US] 0.0422 0.0148 0.0178 0.0074 0.0022
Equal country size and no home 
  bias
  Et0[Welf EA] 21.5074 11.2688 10.0618 3.106 1.4399
  Et0[Welf US] 24.8622 11.2348 13.0827 3.556 1.7581
Equal size and lower home bias 
  (0.65)
  Et0[Welf EA] 0.7382 0.3876 0.1818 0.1384 0.0348
  Et0[Welf US] 0.961 0.2237 0.5004 0.175 0.068
Complete markets (benchmark 
  calibration)
  Et0[Welf EA] 0.0044 0.0026 –0.0008 0.0017 0.0009
  Et0[Welf US] 0.0024 0.0005 0.0022 –0.0002 –0.0001
Complete markets, equal size, and 
    lower home bias (0.65)
  Et0[Welf EA] 0.0269 0.0096 0.0158 0.0013 0.0002
  Et0[Welf US]   0.0381   0.0219   0.0136   0.0016   0.001
17. In this regard the ranges suggested by Benigno (2001) should also be taken with a grain 
of salt, as they derive from varying some parameters without discussion of the implications 
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better oﬀ not to adopt the cooperative policy if there were only U.S. markup 
shocks. Turning to the degree of price stickiness in the intermediate goods 
sector itself, table 3.6 shows the eﬀect of reducing price stickiness by half in 
the intermediate goods sector. Higher ﬂ  exibility in the intermediate goods 
sector increases the gains from cooperation quite drastically. In particular, 
halving the Calvo probability leads to welfare gains of 10 and 17 percent. 
As mentioned earlier, this result should be interpreted with particular cau-
tion, as reducing the degree of price rigidity increases the weight of markup 
volatility in the volatility of the whole economy beyond what we observe in 
the data.
It is also of particular interest to study the role of the incomplete pass- 
through of the exchange rate in generating gains from cooperation. In table 
3.6, the degree of pass- through is increased by assuming that retail prices of 
imported goods are twice as ﬂ  exible as in the benchmark model. A higher 
pass-  through marginally reduces the overall gains from cooperation. How-
ever, under this assumption domestic markup shocks reduce the domestic 
welfare gains while they improve the foreign welfare gains.18 Notice, fur-
thermore, that the welfare gains associated with markup shocks cease to be 
symmetric. Table 3.6 shows what happens if import prices are not indexed 
to domestic CPI inﬂ  ation. The sign of the contribution of markup shocks 
to the gain from cooperation is the same as in the previous case. In this case, 
though, symmetry is preserved.
Finally, we also had a look at the impact of changes in nominal wage rigid-
ity and wage indexation. Somewhat surprisingly, those nominal rigidities do 
not seem to have a large impact on the gains from cooperation.
3.5.3    Degree  of  Openness
It is natural to expect that the gains from cooperation would be higher 
the higher the economic integration of the countries involved. Quoting 
Oudiz and Sachs (1984, 5–6), “. . . the direct eﬀects of commodity trade on 
macroeconomic interdependence remain surprisingly small; at the core, it 
is these relatively small trade links that condition our conclusions regarding 
the returns to coordination.” These authors were talking about export and 
import shares to GNP between the European Community and the United 
States (1982) of between 1.4 and 2.2 percent. While these numbers have 
increased somewhat since then, they remain relatively small. Our calibra-
tion implies that, in the nonstochastic steady state, U.S. exports to the EA 
18. For the sake of comparison, we ran a similar experiment on the simple two- country model 
à la Benigno and Benigno (2006). This simple model would predict that domestic markup 
shocks are detrimental for domestic welfare gains from cooperation and beneﬁ  cial for the for-
eign gains. This result is strongly sensitive to whether wages are ﬂ  exible or not and to whether 
international ﬁ  nancial markets are complete or not. The model dependence of these results 
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are about 8 percent of U.S. GDP while U.S. imports from the EA are about 
11 percent of U.S. GDP. The EA exports to the United States are about 14 
percent of EA GDP, while EA imports from the United States are about 11 
percent of EA GDP. Table 3.7 shows the polar case of equal sized countries 
and no home bias. Although this assumption might look extreme if com-
pared with our benchmark parametrization, the variance decomposition of 
shocks and the moments (standard deviations and cross- correlations) of the 
model are not dramatically diﬀerent from those obtained in our benchmark 
calibration. Nevertheless, the gains from coordination, absent home bias, 
are huge. They reach 21.5 percent for the euro area and 25.3 percent for the 
United States. Almost all of these gains are due to markup volatility.
Table 3.7 also oﬀers an intermediate case, where the trade shares have 
been increased to about 32 percent of GDP in both countries (equal size and 
home-  bias parameter set to 0.65). In this case the welfare gains are almost 
two orders of magnitude larger than in the benchmark calibration, reaching 
about 0.74 percent of steady-  state consumption in the euro area and about 
1.0 percent of steady-  state consumption for the United States.
3.5.4      Some Other Critical Parameters
In this section, we discuss the implications of diﬀerences in some of the 
other parameters of our model that have received particular attention in the 
international monetary policy cooperation literature.
Inter-   and Intratemporal Elasticity of Substitution
Corsetti and Pesenti (2001) show that the cross- country spillover eﬀect of 
monetary policy crucially depends on the size of the intertemporal elasticity 
of substitution relative to the intratemporal elasticity (i.e., the elasticity of 
substitution between imported goods and domestically produced goods). 
With CES goods aggregators and CRRA utility function, the sign of the 
cross derivative of the utility function with respect to the domestically pro-
duced bundle of goods and the imported bundle of goods depends on the 
size of the intratemporal elasticity of substitution relative to the size of the 
intertemporal elasticity of substitution. If the former is larger than the lat-
ter, the two bundles are substitutes; if smaller, they are complements. If they 
have the same size, the consumption spillovers are nil. Nevertheless, even 
in the latter case, policy spillovers could still be present if monetary policy 
can aﬀect the international distribution of labor eﬀort. So, for example, 
an improvement of the terms of trade would tend to export labor eﬀort 
abroad. While the extent of this eﬀect increases in the intratemporal elastic-
ity of substitution, the income gains decrease in this elasticity. In the spirit 
of the “optimum tariﬀ” argument, the lower is the intratemporal elasticity 
of substitution, and the larger the monopolistic rent that the country can 
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Table 3.7 shows the welfare decomposition results for diﬀerent values of 
the inter-  and intratemporal elasticity of substitution. The main result of our 
chapter remains unchanged: the gains from cooperation are very modest.
A more detailed look at the results shows that the gains from cooperation 
seem to decrease in the intratemporal elasticity of substitution (table 3.7).19
Market Completeness
In Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2002) the cooperative central banks face a 
trade- oﬀ between stabilization and increased tradable consumption risk- 
sharing.20 This holds true also in our benchmark calibration, although the 
trade- oﬀ is more complex, involving a larger number of margins.
Increasing the degree of consumption risk-  sharing is welfare improving. 
Nevertheless, without cooperation risk-  sharing cannot be achieved. This 
fact, per se, will generate a gap between the cooperative and noncooperative 
allocations.
Table 3.7 reports the results of our decomposition of the welfare gains 
from cooperation when international ﬁ  nancial markets are complete. Now 
the gains from cooperation are about one order of magnitude smaller than 
in the benchmark calibration. In the same table we show that a sizable reduc-
tion of the gains from cooperation is obtained by introducing market com-
pleteness in a model with larger trade shares.
3.5.5      Alternative Assumptions Regarding the 
Noncooperative Strategy Space
Benigno and Benigno (2006) deﬁ  ne the strategy space of the Nash game 
in terms of the growth rate of the GDP deﬂ  ator. In our model, we do not 
see any reason to assume that each central bank should take (any measure 
of) foreign inﬂ  ation as given when solving its noncooperative policy prob-
lem. On the contrary, in the context of an open-  loop noncooperative game, 
it sounds more reasonable to us to think that each central bank must take 
as given the choices of the other central bank regarding either the quantity 
or the price that clears the market in which the other central bank is active. 
Nevertheless, for the sake of comparison we computed the noncooperative 
equilibrium under two alternative speciﬁ  cations of the strategy space: in 
terms of the PPI inﬂ  ation rates and in terms of the CPI inﬂ  ation rates.
The Nash equilibrium brought about by the PPI inﬂ  ation rates in the 
benchmark calibration is indeterminate, so that we should conclude that the 
gains from cooperation (in this case) are potentially huge.
In contrast, the Nash equilibrium brought about by the CPI inﬂ  ation 
19. Benigno (2001) shows that the gains are not monotonic in the intratemporal elasticity. 
We have considered also values of 2, 4, and 6 for the intratemporal elasticity, conﬁ  rming that 
in this range the welfare gains seem to be lower the larger this elasticity.
20. In their model the risk-  sharing motive is absent when the intertemporal elasticity of 
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rates is saddle-  path stable, in the benchmark calibration. The gains from 
cooperation in this case are larger than those obtained when solving the 
game in terms of the money supplies. In particular, the gains from coopera-
tion would be 0.32 percent for the euro area and 0.28 percent for the United 
States. Compared with the results reported in table 3.5, the gains are now 
one order of magnitude larger.
3.6      Performance of Simple Rules
Monetary policy is often described in terms of interest rate feedback rules 
of the type used in our calibration. Studying the gains from cooperation 
when central banks optimally choose the parameters of such feedback rules 
is not the main focus of our chapter. Nevertheless, in order to gain a sense 
of how our results would change if the policy problem is described in terms 
of particular interest rate rules, we have carried out two experiments. In the 
ﬁ  rst, each central bank maximizes its objective function by choosing the 
coeﬃcients of an inertial interest rate rule that responds to CPI inﬂ  ation 
and real GDP, where the degree of inertia is the same as in the calibrated 
rule. This rule amounts to an inertial Taylor rule (Taylor 1993). This experi-
ment shows that in both the cooperative and noncooperative equilibrium 
the central banks do not want to respond to output. This result is similar 
to the ﬁ  ndings of Schmitt-  Grohé and Uribe (2007a, 2007b), in a closed 
economy setting. The reason, we conjecture, is that the measure of output 
used in the model is the actual deviation of output from the steady state. 
The result would likely diﬀer had we used the deviation of output from its 
eﬃcient ﬂ  exible price and wage level.
The second experiment assumes that the (inertial) interest rate rule 
responds to CPI inﬂ  ation and wage inﬂ  ation.21 This rule is dictated by the 
results shown in Levin et al. (2006) that the optimal interest rate rule in a 
closed economy with wage and price stickiness attributes a large weight to 
wage inﬂ  ation. This experiment shows that both the cooperative and the 
noncooperative central banks prefer to respond only to wage inﬂ  ation.22 In 
what follows, we therefore consider a closed-  loop Nash game in the simple 
inertial wage inﬂ  ation interest rate rules.
Figure 3.3 summarizes the results. The graph shows the contour plot 
of the EA and U.S. welfare functions (in utility units) in deviation from 
the steady-  state value when the share of import (and export) in GDP is 
21. Output is omitted on the basis of the result of the ﬁ  rst experiment, thus easing the 
computational burden.
22. The search of the optimal response coeﬃcients was done by imposing a grid for each 
parameter. The step size and the range of these grids has been adjusted in order to reﬁ  ne the 
results to a convincing degree. Given this procedure we cannot exclude that the optimal rule 
requires to respond to CPI inﬂ  ation and GDP with very small coeﬃcients. Given the purpose 
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increased to about 32 percent.23 The ﬁ  gure is reminiscent of the graphical 
analysis used by Hamada (1976) to derive the noncooperative equilibria in 
his monetary policy game. On the horizontal axis we have the EA response 
coeﬃcient to wage inﬂ  ation, while on the vertical axis we have the U.S. 
response coeﬃcient. The straight lines crossing the contours represent the 
reaction functions of each central bank to the other bank’s choice of reac-
tion coeﬃcient. As explained by Hamada (1976), the reaction function of 
the euro area passes through the point of tangency of each EA contour with 
horizontal lines. The reaction function of the United States passes through 
the point of tangency of each U.S. contour with vertical lines. The ﬁ  rst 
interesting result is that the reaction functions are perpendicular: the Nash 
equilibrium involves strictly dominant strategies. This result suggests that, 
for the strategy space considered here, there is no monetary policy interde-
pendence, although there are international monetary policy spillovers. The 
second interesting result is that the Nash equilibrium (denoted by “N” in 
the graph) diﬀers from the cooperative equilibrium (denoted by “C” in the 
graph): the Nash equilibrium implies a weaker response to wage inﬂ  ation 
than the cooperative equilibrium.
For the game described in ﬁ  gure 3.3 the gains from cooperation amount 
to 0.0013 percent for the euro area and 0.0021 percent for the United States 
(in consumption units). While these numbers are smaller than those pre-
sented in table 3.7 for the same degree of openness but under the open- 
Fig. 3.3    Nash and cooperative equilibria under inertial interest rate rules reacting 
to wage inﬂ  ation only
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loop Nash equilibrium, one should notice that the level of welfare obtained 
under cooperation with this simple rule is lower than that obtained under 
the Ramsey cooperative allocation. The diﬀerence between the former and 
the latter amounts to –0.4289 percent for the euro area and 0.2287 percent 
for the United States, making the simple rule suboptimal from the global 
point of view.
These experiments also conﬁ  rm that under the benchmark model; that is, 
with a smaller degree of openness, the gains from cooperation are smaller, 
amounting to 0.00008 percent for the euro area and –0.00003 percent for 
the United States.
Finally, table 3.8 shows that the loss incurred in adopting the calibrated 
rule as opposed to the (Ramsey) optimal cooperative policy are not very 
large. Levin et al. (2006) in a closed economy model estimated with U.S. 
data, ﬁ  nd that the loss incurred by adopting the estimated simple interest 
rate rule as opposed to the optimal policy implies a welfare cost of about 
0.56 percent of steady-  state consumption. We ﬁ  nd a welfare cost that is 
about ﬁ  ve times smaller.
3.7    Conclusion
In this chapter, we have analyzed the gains from monetary policy coop-
eration in a quantitative two-  region DSGE model for the euro area and the 
United States. A number of recent papers have revived the debate about 
the gains from international monetary policy cooperation. None of these, 
nevertheless, has used large-  scale DSGE models to quantify the gains from 
cooperation. Our chapter is a ﬁ  rst attempt to ﬁ  ll this gap. Our analysis shows 
that the gains from cooperation are very sensitive to the degree of openness 
of the economies. Given the current degree of openness of the U.S. and euro 
area economies, and in line with the recent literature, we ﬁ  nd that the gains 
from cooperation are small. They amount to about 0.03 percent of steady- 
state consumption. This is an order of magnitude higher than the gains 
suggested by Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2002), but nevertheless very small. As we 
increase the degree of openness from 10 to 15 percent to about 32 percent, 
the gains from cooperation rise to a sizable level; that is, about 1 percent of 
steady-  state consumption. Our analysis, therefore, suggests that the recent 
trends in international economic integration will be accompanied by larger 
gains from policy cooperation.
Table 3.8   Welfare decomposition: Cooperative policy vs. calibrated simple rules
Variable   All shocks   mkpEA   mkpUS   ΣEA other shocks   ΣUS other shocks
Et0[WelfEA] 0.1366 0.0145 0.0248 0.055 0.0424
Et0[Welf US] 0.1067   –0.0088   –0.0161   0.0224   0.1092188    Günter Coenen, Giovanni Lombardo, Frank Smets, and Roland Straub
Our analysis also shows that markup shocks are the most important 
source of gains from international monetary policy cooperation. A deeper 
understanding of the sources of these type of disturbances will therefore be 
crucial for gauging the need for closer cooperation in the future.
There are various potentially fruitful avenues for further research. First, in 
the absence of a fully estimated two-  region version of the NAWM, we have 
used a calibrated version of the model. Performing the same analysis on an 
estimated model would be useful in providing a benchmark for performing 
robustness and sensitivity analysis. In particular, one could use the posterior 
distribution of the model to calculate the empirically relevant range of the 
gains from cooperation given the structure of the economy. Second, we have 
focused on price markup shocks as the only ineﬃcient sources of varia-
tion in the dynamics of the economy (with the exception of the exchange 
rate shocks). A full empirical analysis should also investigate the impact of 
markup shocks in the labor market and the imported goods sector. Third, 
we have focused our analysis of the noncooperative equilibrium to an open- 
loop Nash equilibrium where the monetary policy instruments are deﬁ  ned 
in terms of nominal money growth rates. An alternative and possibly more 
plausible game is one where each monetary authority takes the reaction 
function of the foreign central bank as given.
In section 3.6 we have taken a ﬁ  rst step in that direction, analyzing closed- 
loop Nash equilibria in a few simple feedback rules. The results conﬁ  rm our 
ﬁ  ndings that in the benchmark case the gains from cooperation are small 
but increasing in the degree of trade integration. However, a more complete 
analysis using more complicated feedback rules is warranted. Fourth, the 
importance of markup shocks for the gains from cooperation raises ques-
tions about the microfoundations of those shocks. A deeper theory of why 
prices are sticky and what are the sources of the high-  frequency variation 
in some prices would be important to gain more conﬁ  dence in the welfare 
implications of such markup shocks.
Appendix
Description of the Solution Method
The cooperative and noncooperative (open-  loop Nash) nonlinear ﬁ  rst- 
order conditions of the policymakers’ problem were derived using our 
Matlab code (compatible with DYNARE [Juillard 1996]). This code (“Lq- 
solution”) is available from the authors on request. The derivation of the 
policymakers’ ﬁ  rst-  order conditions is based on Benigno and Woodford 
(2006).
As money is neutral in the steady state of our model, the solution of the International Transmission and Monetary Policy Cooperation    1 8 9
steady- state value of the endogenous variables is independent of the solution 
of the steady- state value of the Lagrange multipliers of the policy problem. 
The steady state of the structural equations was solved using a suite of non-
linear solvers (SolvOpt, by Kuntsevich and Kappel [1997], SA (simulated 
annealing) by Goﬀe [1996] and Matlab’s fsolve with use of the analytical 
Jacobian of the model). The steady-  state value of the Lagrange multipliers 
is then obtained by solving a least-  squares problem.
The (ﬁ  rst-   and second-  order accurate) state-  space solution of the model 
(under the diﬀerent speciﬁ  cations of monetary policy) was then obtained 
using Dynare (version 4).
The conditional moments were constructed by iterating the ﬁ  rst-   and 
second-  order accurate state-  space solutions returned by Dynare.
For the calibration exercise we used a combination of Dynare output and 
our own Matlab codes (including HP ﬁ  ltering).
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Comment  Christopher A. Sims
The chapter sets up a state of the art two- country calibrated model in which 
monetary policy has welfare eﬀects. It uses a second-  order expansion to get 
accurate calculations of these eﬀects, using the model’s own agent utility 
functions, and thereby gives us a prototype of how this analysis should be 
done. But as the authors acknowledge in various caveats in the text, it is 
really only a prototype. There are many aspects of the model that are dubi-
ous and likely to be important to the conclusion. Most of my comments, 
therefore, point out questionable aspects of the chapter. At the end, I provide 
a constructive suggestion.
The Nature of the Game
The chapter models interaction of monetary authorities as a Nash equi-
librium, but the nature of such an equilibrium depends crucially on what 
variables each player treats as given when choosing the player’s own moves. 
The chapter’s central case is that each monetary authority takes the entire 
past and future of the other’s money stock as given in optimizing its own 
money stock choice. This is certainly unrealistic, and the chapter’s own sensi-
tivity analyses show that its conclusion that the welfare gains from coopera-
tion are small is sensitive to this choice.
It is perhaps worthwhile to catalog the results of the chapter’s sensitivity 
analysis: if the policy choice variables are the time paths of interest rates, 
the result is instability—in other words, extremely large welfare losses from 
noncooperation. The same is true if the policy choice variable is the pro-
ducer price index (PPI). If the choice variable is consumer price index (CPI) 
path, the losses from noncooperation are ﬁ  nite, but ten times larger than in 
the case where the money time path is the choice variable. When the choice 
variables are the coeﬃcients in a Taylor rule, the losses from noncooperation 
are minuscule, but “cooperation” in the choice of these coeﬃcients leaves the 
equilibrium welfare far from the Ramsey optimal solution—by an amount 
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